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1  | INTRODUC TION
In 2004, the region of Nariño in the southwest of Colombia was 
highly dependent on coffee farming. However, the region expe-
rienced migration from coffee farming families due to low socio-
economic development, the persistence of armed conflict and the 
limited capacity and restricted access to markets. After almost two 
years of exploring and designing a joint project, a partnership was 
set up between Empresas de Nariño (a local coffee exporter), the 
International Organization for Migration, Starbucks, Carcafe and the 
Dutch government to improve the living conditions of 1,160 vulner-
able coffee-growing families in Nariño.
The partnership was designed as a 4-year project. The partners 
gained such value from the first project that they decided to rep-
licate the strategy with a new group of 800 coffee-growing fami-
lies from a different region in Nariño from 2009 to 2012. In both 
periods, the organizations involved remained the same, except for 
the bilateral development agency; the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) replaced the Dutch develop-
ment agency in the second iteration of the partnership. After the 
second project was also successfully completed, the active collab-
oration formally ended. After almost 10 years of intensive collab-
oration, the following effects were observed: (a) at the community 
level, new small-scale coffee growers became empowered, (b) at 
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Abstract
Drawing on a longitudinal case study of a 10-year cross-sector partnership for 
 development in Colombia, this paper makes three contributions to current discussions 
on new collaborative governance approaches in which business, non-governmental 
organizations and development agencies jointly address development challenges. 
First, our study explores how partnerships can be successful in achieving longer term 
development while being designed as short-term governance arrangements. Second, 
we shed light on how power asymmetries can shape partnership governance. Many 
studies have highlighted the negative aspects of donor involvement in cross-sector 
partnerships. We identify, however, that an interplay of formal and informal govern-
ance in partnerships can provide a positive enabling framework for partner relation-
ships to grow and mature. Third, the case highlights that the studied partnership 
employed governance mechanisms that facilitate local ownership and empower small-
scale farmers, which effected (longer term) value chain relationships. In this regard, 
our case study helps to understand governance processes and conditions under which 
transformative local partnerships can emerge and sustain in post-conflict settings. 
The paper adds observations on the collaborative governance content that is required 
for a more integrative research approach to corporate contributions to development.
2  |     PFISTERER and Van TULdER
the organizational level, new structures and processes were inter-
nalized, and new collaborations were set up to address the grand 
challenges in conflict-affected regions in Colombia and (c) at the in-
terorganizational level, the relationships between partners, farmers 
and the development agency changed.
The Nariño case presents the practice of a cross-sector partner-
ship for development (CSPD) as a temporary governance arrangement 
that links commercial, social and development policy objectives in a 
(post-)conflict region. It successfully managed to reduce two key ten-
sions of projects in development cooperation. First, it managed to build 
successful relationships between partners, companies and small-scale 
farmers despite short-term project designs. Second, it developed col-
laborative relationships and local ownership within control-oriented 
partnering frameworks set by the development agencies.
CSPDs—as development projects—are confronted with the 
interrelated tensions of stimulating long-term transformative re-
lationships through short-term project design and transforming re-
lationships in the context of power imbalances. Practice shows that 
CSPDs often face governance challenges in areas such as account-
ability, transparency, inclusiveness, risk sharing, monitoring and eval-
uation and ownership (Pfisterer, 2017). CSPDs put much emphasis 
on formal governance mechanisms to prevent risks that business in-
terests override public development objectives. Companies are also 
often required to move their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
strategies “beyond compliance” (Barkemeyer, 2009) with formal in-
stitutions—which presents them with some due diligence risks. At the 
same time, however, partnerships for development are expected to 
stimulate joint commitment to long-term interaction, equality, mutu-
ality and balance of power (Fowler, 2000; Miraftab, 2004; Visseren-
Hamakers, Arts, & Glasbergen, 2007). In particular in (post-)conflict 
settings, fostering good governance, trust and peace through strong 
community involvement and by addressing issues directly related to 
conflict is, therefore, important elements that partnerships should 
stimulate (Abramov, 2009; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015a, 2015b).
Power dynamics are at stake, however, in CSPDs, and research 
highlights that partnerships may even reinforce power imbalances 
(e.g., Lister, 2000; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). Power imbal-
ances may undermine the mutuality needed for effective partnering 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). Partnerships operating in context 
emerging from conflict can be at risk of becoming “disintegrated into 
patterns of mutual distrust, threats and accusations” as shown in 
a Public-Private Partnership case in Lebanon (Jamali, 2004, p. 427). 
Consequently, long-term sustainability and local ownership of part-
nerships after the project funding ends have been found to be rela-
tively weak. This limits the potential of CSPDs to fill the institutional 
void that exists in most developing countries, conflict contexts and 
global commodity chains, through the generation of proto-institutions 
that can create positive effects long after the partnership (or the fund-
ing) has been terminated (cf., Vellema, Ton, de Roo, & van Wijk, 2013).
It is striking that partnerships between businesses, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and development agencies emerged in the late 
1990s, especially in the realm of blurred boundaries between societal 
actors and with the promise to address complex societal challenges 
(e.g., Glasbergen, 2007). Partnering should help changing relation-
ships in the aid system (Fowler, 2000). CSR scholars frame and dis-
cuss partnerships as a novel form of governance undertaken by firms, 
governments and other societal institutions (e.g., Crane, 2010). For 
companies, partnerships are considered a way to make stakeholder 
engagement more effective and to empower these stakeholders as 
business partners (e.g., Jamali, Yianni, & Abdallah, 2011).
The gap between the promise of CSPDs as new governance 
arrangements for development on the one hand, and the tensions 
that may hamper the partnership effectiveness on the other, might 
indicate that either the partnership approach as a new way of devel-
opment cooperation could be less effective, or that it is difficult to 
design an appropriate governance approach to deal with fundamen-
tal tensions in these types of partnerships. The question emerges, 
therefore, how successful CSPDs—such as the Nariño case—are 
actually governed in challenging contexts, despite the tensions of 
short-term project design and power asymmetries.
To address this question, we apply a longitudinal case study of 
the Nariño partnership. While CSPDs, and development agency in-
volvement are important in post-conflict settings, empirical insights 
about their practices remain limited, particularly at the local level 
(Kolk & Lenfant, 2015a; Pishchikova, 2014). Colombia provides some 
innovative examples of CSPDs that could inform ongoing interna-
tional discourse and debate on the role of partnerships in (post-) con-
flict contexts (Godnick & Klein, 2009).
To understand the governance practices and mechanisms that 
facilitate successful dealing with the tensions in CSPDs, we focus 
on the interaction of formal and informal governance processes 
and structures throughout the lifetime of the partnership (Hayes, 
Cornforth, & Vangen, 2011). We examine the underlying practices 
and mechanisms that develop in partnerships to study the evolution 
of cross-sector governance tensions over a longer period.
Our insights contribute to discussions of partnerships as (effec-
tive) governance approaches for development in three ways.
First, using a case of consecutive partnership governance, we 
identify that governance of CSPDs evolves over time and shapes ten-
sions. Unravelling mechanisms and practices in different phases of the 
partnership allows us to better understand how such partnerships can 
be governed towards development outcomes (Hayes et al., 2011) and 
help companies to move their CSR involvement beyond compliance 
with formal institutions (Barkemeyer, 2009) while engaging in entre-
preneurial, proactive and collaborative strategies to address structural 
and (eco-)systemic origins of development challenges (Van Tulder, 
2018). This adds to the call to better understand how relational quality 
evolves during the partnering process (Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 
2012). It does, however, have consequences for the degree of flex-
ibility and adaptability of partnership governance practices, which 
complements the increasingly important literature on developmental 
evaluation (Patton, 2011; Van Tulder & Keen, 2018).
Second, by analysing partnerships in development cooperation, 
we broaden the current focus in the CSR literature on mainly dy-
adic relationships (CSO-business) (e.g., Wadham & Warren, 2013; 
Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 2012) towards tripartite partnerships 
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with the involvement of public development agencies. With the in-
creasing attention on the role of governments in CSR (e.g., Dentchev, 
van Balen, & Hazendonck, 2015), the question emerges what role 
and influence public development agencies have in the governance 
of CSPDs, in which firms have a business interest that could guaran-
tee the longer term financial sustainability of the partnership. These 
insights contribute to the plea for an “integrated research agenda” 
(Medina-Munoz & Medina-Munoz, 2020) aimed at enhancing the 
role of companies in development in general and in poverty allevi-
ation specifically—in particular in interaction with the efforts of the 
United Nations in its Sustainable Development agenda (Van Zanten 
& Van Tulder, 2018). We identify that control enables relationship 
building, not only among partners but also between donor and part-
ners. In doing so, we balance discussions in development studies that 
mainly focus on the negative aspects of control and power asymme-
tries in partnerships (Miraftab, 2004; Pishchikova, 2014). We bring 
new insights into actual governance practices to the minimal body of 
literature on the role of development agencies in partnerships with 
the private sector (Pedersen, 2005; Stadtler & Probst, 2012).
Third, by examining the Nariño case, which was governed in a com-
plex, fragile context, we contribute to current research that aims to 
understand CSPDs as a governance approach in fragile contexts (Kolk 
& Lenfant, 2015a), and in particular for the coffee sector in Colombia 
(Miklian & Medina Bickel, 2018). Like many CSPDs, this case lacked 
the involvement of the target group (farmers) in the formal governance 
structure of the partnership (e.g., Bitzer, Francken, & Glasbergen, 
2008). The projects nevertheless managed to be locally embedded, in 
contrast to many internationally funded short-term interventions. Our 
case highlights that partnerships can employ governance mechanisms 
that can facilitate local ownership and contribute to the empowerment 
of small-scale farmers. This has an effect on (longer term) value chain 
relationships (Civera, de Colle, & Casalengo, 2019).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical background and further delineates part of the gap in the 
existing discourse. Section 3 discusses our methodology, describes 
our research context, data collection and analysis. We present our 
findings in Section 4, and Section 5 presents three interrelated dis-
cussion points that can help to address governance tensions that 
occur in these types of partnerships. In Section 6, we provide our 
thoughts on how the findings can be generalized and offer sugges-
tions for future research.
2  | GOVERNANCE AND TENSIONS IN 
PARTNERSHIPS FOR DE VELOPMENT
2.1 | Partnerships for development
Cross-sector partnerships have received growing academic interest 
as innovative ways to promote both business and societal objectives. 
While increasingly scholars focus on partnerships implemented in 
developing countries, only few researchers focus on cross-sector 
partnerships that operate within the framework of development 
cooperation (except for e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brogaard & 
Petersen, 2018; Kolk, Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008; Pedersen, 2005). 
Controversially, partnerships between civil society organizations 
and businesses are often funded by bilateral development agen-
cies,1  but research has hardly examined these implications. Although 
CSPDs can differ in many aspects, including actor configuration, de-
sign and objectives, they do share several key characteristics. They 
are more or less formalized, temporary arrangements between ac-
tors from the public sector, private (for profit) sector and civil society 
organizations who enter into a joint project to accomplish long-term 
social and/or economic development in developing countries. This is 
done through sharing costs, risks, responsibilities, competencies and 
knowledge (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Brogaard & Petersen, 
2018; Kolk et al., 2008; Manning & Roessler, 2014; Stadtler, 2015).
2.2 | Tensions in partnerships for development
CSPDs need to align (commercial) business interests, social interests 
of CSOs and policy interests of development agencies. In this con-
text, CSPDs face two (interrelated) key tensions that may affect their 
effectiveness: (a) stimulating long-term transformative relationship 
through short-term project design and (b) transforming relationships 
in the context of power asymmetries. Both dimensions have not yet 
been the subject of extensive research in the area of CSPDs.
2.2.1 | Stimulating long-term transformative 
relationships through short-term project design
CSPDs are often designed as short-term projects but aim to trans-
form relationships in the long term (Manning & Roessler, 2014). As in 
the example of the Nariño case, donor-driven partnerships for devel-
opment often start as pilot projects, testing the partnering approach 
to deliver the desired results in a pre-defined period. Pursuing 
longer term development goals and relationships though concrete, 
time-limited projects, however, often brings about a critical tension 
for partnerships (Manning & Roessler, 2014). Development scholars 
stress that partnering is about developing relationships, therefore, 
the project should be considered as a vehicle to explore relationships 
(Fowler, 2000). From a collaboration perspective, the limited time-
frame of projects leads to interrupted and discontinued relationships 
(Grabher, 2002). In temporary governance arrangements, collabora-
tive teams are dismantled at pre-set times. Moreover, the inherent 
time pressure to deliver outputs in partnership projects challenges 
relationship building. In other words, it hinders the emergence of im-
portant partnership intangibles such as reputation, trust, relational 
capital, learning, knowledge, joint problem solving, communication, 
coordination and transparency, which are essential for value crea-
tion (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). Cross-sector partnership research 
has highlighted that long-term relationships are a positive prerequi-
site for sustaining value creation (Murphy, Arenas, & Batista, 2015). 
The critical element for alternative livelihoods of conflict-affected 
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populations is sustainability in the long term (Abramov, 2009). A 
long-term approach might indeed be required to create new gov-
ernance modalities and to achieve transformation in turbulent en-
vironments, such as in conflict-affected regions. One assumption 
about partnerships is, therefore, that bringing the domestic and 
international private sector on board and supporting both will con-
tribute to sustainable solutions (Godnick & Klein, 2009). Although 
development cooperation can facilitate social transformation, the 
latter is thought to be a locally owned and driven process (Elbers, 
Knippenberg, & Schulpen, 2014).
2.2.2 | Transforming relationships in the context of 
power asymmetries
Partnerships in development cooperation are set up with the idea 
that they are effective governance mechanisms for inclusion and 
participation of key actors required for achieving sustainable change 
(Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). In general, however, actors in part-
nerships tend to differ in terms of their control over resources while 
their interests are diverse (Dewulf & Elbers, 2018). Power dynamics 
can have a range of undesirable consequences as low-power actors 
may be co-opted, ignored, overruled or excluded by dominant par-
ties (Dewulf & Elbers, 2018, p. 1). Research on CSPDs highlights that 
actors with fewer resources, such as smallholders or local govern-
ments, are often not involved in the decision making of partnerships 
in the coffee sector (e.g., Bitzer et al., 2008; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015b). 
The focus on business engagement in CSPDs may even risk crowd-
ing out local governments; while they fill the void left by the state, 
they may also deepen existing regional inequalities in terms of state 
services and attention (Rettberg, 2004).
Studies have shown that partnerships in the development con-
text are challenged to equalize power and that there is even the 
danger that partners reinforce power asymmetries (Lister, 2000; 
Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). Traditionally, donors finance devel-
opment projects and set the rules of the game for the partnership, 
for example, by defining the substantive scope and conditions of the 
partnership (Elbers & Schulpen, 2013). Business is another powerful 
actor in partnerships, and business logic may overshadow the de-
velopment orientation of partnerships. CSPDs with public funding 
are, therefore, often characterized by procedures for ensuring (pub-
lic) accountability, public value creation and fair value distribution 
within a predefined time frame (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). 
Proper safeguards are required to ensure that public services are not 
compromised for the sake of private profits (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, 
& Boyer, 2010). However, such controls based on administrative pro-
cedures and practices can undercut the full expression of partner-
ship principles (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004) and contradict the 
notion of “non-hierarchical relationships” as highlighted in several 
definitions of partnerships (e.g., Glasbergen, 2007).
To conclude, power imbalances within CSPDs are an almost un-
avoidable “fact of life”. Cross-sector partnerships in development 
cooperation are—and will remain—challenged by the tension of 
aiming to change relationships. At the same time the collaboration 
takes place in a context of existing resources and power asymme-
tries which are not offset through formal rules pertaining to decision 
making and representation (Bitzer & Glasbergen, 2015, p. 38).
2.3 | Understanding tensions and governance 
approaches of partnerships
CSPDs face governance tensions, but how should they address 
them? Tensions describe conflicting, contradictory or compet-
ing positions that partnerships are confronted with (Hayes et al., 
2011). Tensions appear through formal and informal structures and 
processes and may change over time. Tensions are connected to 
partnership performance and directly affect those who carry out 
governance activities. Ultimately, tensions must be addressed to en-
sure the continuation and goal achievement of a collaboration (Das 
& Teng, 2001).
Research suggests that addressing tensions is a way of governing 
effectively (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, there is no understand-
ing as yet about the strategies, mechanisms and practices through 
which tensions in CSPDs are governed (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 
2015). To understand how tensions are addressed through gover-
nance, we follow the approach suggested by Hayes et al. (2011) to 
identify informal and formal governing mechanisms and their interac-
tions throughout the lifetime of the partnership. They specify that the 
“governance of partnerships entails the design and use of structure 
and processes that enable actors to set the overall direction of the 
collaboration. It also requires coordinating and allocating resources 
for the collaboration as a whole as well as accountability for its ac-
tivities” (Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2015, p. 1,244). Governance 
is carried out through structures and processes. Governance struc-
tures refer to the rules and resources people use, such as contracts or 
working standards. Governance processes cover the behaviour and 
actions of individuals (e.g., negotiating, committing). These structures 
and processes cover both formal and informal aspects. Formal gover-
nance outlines structures that define partners’ roles and obligations 
to each other (e.g., contracts). In contrast, formal processes are car-
ried out through positions of authority (e.g., negotiations, steering or 
controlling) (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2000). Informal governance cov-
ers structures and processes relating to participants’ social behaviour 
and informal relationships (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Formal and infor-
mal governance mechanisms are distinct yet interrelated mechanisms 
(Rufin & Rivera-Santos, 2012) that interact throughout the partner-
ship process (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Therefore, we need to un-
derstand informal and formal structures and processes if we want to 
assess the effectiveness of partnerships (Bryson et al., 2015).
3  | METHODOLOGY
We take the above elaborated perspective of tensions and govern-
ance to explore how successful partnerships for development—such 
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as the Nariño case—are actually governed despite the tensions in-
herent in development projects. The paper focuses on the process 
of partnering to understand how tensions emerge, change and un-
fold over time in complex situations and settings (Langley, Smallman, 
Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013). We apply a longitudinal case study ap-
proach of the Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee Growing 
Families in Nariño in Colombia case. This case was selected because 
it represents a temporary governance arrangement that managed to 
develop successful long-term relationships. The historical case pro-
vides a unique opportunity to consider the long-term effects of a still 
relatively new phenomenon.
3.1 | Research context
The department of Nariño in southwest Colombia seems to be far 
away from being a region of a middle-income country. In 2012, 
Nariño counted more than 30,000 smallholder coffee producers, 
most of them were highly dependent on farming income (Vellema, 
Casanova, Gonzalez, & D’Haese, 2015). Nariño is well suited for 
growth of high-quality specialty coffee, because of its unique agro-
ecological conditions (Hernandez-Aguilera et al., 2018). Despite 
the opportunities that specialty coffee markets offer, the business 
conditions for and the coffee growing practices by small farmers in 
Nariño were hindered by three factors.
First, most small coffee growers in Nariño were poor. Access to 
education, water and energy is limited, and social security and health 
services were deficient. Unfulfilled basic needs decreased the coffee 
growers’ capacity to run their farms effectively. Infrastructure, such 
as paved roads, was scarce and inadequate. This hampered the logis-
tics for coffee supply and prevented access to farms trying to build 
production capacity.
Second, global demand for high quality coffee that adheres to 
environmental conservation and fairtrade standards was increasing 
at the time of the research. Responding to this demand effectively 
depends on farmers’ adaptation of best practices and investments in 
improved farms. For Nariño's small producers, such improvements 
were beyond their resources and technical capacity and as a result 
they were unable to join the coffee value chain and secure satisfac-
tory prices.
Third, Nariño was affected by armed conflict between guerrillas, 
the state and paramilitary groups. At the end of the 1990s, the de-
partment of Nariño experienced an intensification of armed conflict 
closely linked to the increase in illicit cultivation in the region. Since 
then, Nariño has become the department with the greatest area of 
illicit crops under cultivation in Colombia. The region had strategic 
value for armed groups because of its proximity to national borders 
and isolated coastlines that facilitates illegal trafficking. As a result, 
coffee growing families were vulnerable to violence and some were 
forced to abandon their plantations and coffee production.
Maintaining and strengthening the livelihoods of conflict-af-
fected populations during or after conflict was high on the agenda 
of development agencies in Colombia (Godnick & Klein, 2009). 
Partnerships provided a promising—and to a certain extent inevi-
table—approach for smallholder farmers to address the interlinked 
challenge of peace-building and sustainable development. The 
Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee Growing Families in 
Nariño in Colombia developed a multi-impact programme targeting 
vulnerable communities with high displacement risk (see Table 1 for 
project specifications). The main purpose was to contribute to the 
social and economic stability of the Nariño region.
3.2 | Data collection and analysis
Data collection was organized in three rounds between 2011 and 
2013, which allowed us to follow the development of the partner-
ship over a longer period. Data were sourced from (a) partnership 
documents (encompassing project proposals, partnership agree-
ments and progress reports) (see Appendix A); (b) a total of 27 semi-
structured (group-)interviews with 15 key actors involved in the 
partnership governance and management, ranging in their positions 
from company director to partnership project coordinator and ex-
ternal evaluator (see Appendix B); and (c) field visits to the Nariño 
region to meet with five coffee-growing communities involved in the 
project.
Interviews and field visits formed the main source of our primary 
data, with documents serving as an important triangulation and 
supplementary source for understanding the process. Documents 
that were not publicly available were accessed through the devel-
opment agency and the project partners. This study focuses on 
the relationships between the actors involved in the partnership, 
witnessed from the accounts of participants who were directly in-
volved. All formal partners involved throughout the different phases 
of the partnership were interviewed in several rounds, except for 
partners from one organization, which was mainly represented in 
the partnership by its business partner. In addition, during the in-
terviews two key stakeholders were suggested for interviewing, 
who happened to know the partnership at the strategic and man-
agement levels (a local government representative and an external 
evaluator). Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 min, and the initial 
interview protocol was mostly standardized across informants, with 
some customization for position in the partnership and phase of in-
volvement. Initial questions focused on the partnership formation, 
the roles and contributions, the partnering process, the value of the 
partnership, the differences between the projects and the context 
in which partnership activities were implemented. Subsequently, the 
interviews became more focused as the themes related to various 
relationships within the partnership, their emergence in the process 
of partnering over the period of two projects, governance structures 
and processes and the key challenges and mechanisms for dealing 
with them.
We visited five coffee growing families and associations; three 
that participated in the first phase (PPP1) and two that participated 
in the second phase (PPP2). We had focus group meetings with these 
farmers and were showed the farms. These conversations were more 
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unstructured and followed a narrating method. Farmers were invited 
to tell us about how they had become involved in the programme, 
how they had contributed, what value they had gained, but also what 
challenges they had faced during and after the implementation of 
the activities. We also asked questions related to their relationships 
with partnership partners.
Out of the 27 interviews and 5 focus group meetings, 31 were 
audio-recorded and then transcribed verbatim and, if held in 
Spanish, translated into English. In one case, we were not allowed 
to audio-record the interview, therefore detailed notes were taken 
during the interview. The interaction of the researcher with the 
interviewees over several periods of time allowed us to validate 
the findings.
The partnership documents and the interview transcripts were 
analysed in two rounds with the support of the AtlasTI software. In 
the first round, the partnership process was deconstructed by constru-
ing the partnerships as a sequence of formal and informal governance 
events (Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Ven, 2013). 
Coding was focused on understanding the process of partnering and 
providing insights into formal governance events (such as signing the 
partnering agreement, submitting the final report or external evalua-
tion), and activities that are titled as informal governance events (such 
as the first partner contact, project formulation or making use of each 
other's network). Descriptive codes were used to provide insights into 
the “history” and sequence of the partnership activities. This first round 
of analysis aimed to understand how formal and informal governance 
each continually inform and define the other. Due to the dynamic and 
evolutionary nature of the partnership, governance evolved over the 
partnership's life cycle rather than being implemented from the begin-
ning (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). The result was mapped in a process 
flowchart where the drawing presents an event chronology of formal 
and informal codes. The form of the boxes indicates whether the event 
described represents a formal governance event (sharp-cornered rect-
angles) or an informal governance event (flag-shapes). The process 
mapping allowed us to define two successive partnership phases (PPP1 
and PPP2) and to analyse how the changing context from the previous 
period impacted subsequent events in the later period (Langely et al., 
2013) (Figure 1).
Deconstructing the process reveals the structure of events of 
the case but does not tell us about the underlying forces driving 
them. In a second round of analysis, therefore, inductive theorizing 
occurred through a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis aimed to 
track the governance throughout the process of partnering, and to 
identify the practices of dealing with the tensions in the repeated 
collaboration. Thematic analysis is a particularly useful method of 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis started by coding interesting 
features of data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set. 
Such initial codes that appeared interesting allowed us to identify 
repeated patterns across the data set. Next, codes were collated 
into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential 
theme. In this interpretative analysis, the data were approached with 
TA B L E  1   Overview of project specifications
PPP1: Sustainable development programme for coffee 
growing families in Nariño  
PPP2: Sustainable development programme for coffee 
growing families, victims of the armed conflict in Nariño
International Organization for Migration, Empresas de Narino, 
Starbucks, Carcafe, Dutch government
Partners International Organization for Migration, Empresas de 
Narino, Starbucks, Carcafe, USAID
1,080 coffee growing families in Northern part of coffee 
growing region
Target 800 families in Western part of coffee growing area
October 2004–June 2007 Period May 2009–October 2011
COP$ 6.231.634.197 (50% funded by Dutch government and 
50% by private partners)
Budget COP$2.400.000.000 (50% funded by USAID and 50% by 
private partners
Economic: Formation of value chain (promote associations; 
provision of technical training for best practices in coffee 
production; improvement of production facilities
Core components Technical: Technical assistance for sustainable growing; 
installation of water treatment systems; promotion of 
environmental protection plans
Environmental: Implementation of environmentally friendly 
agriculture (e.g., water treatment, preventing erosion); 
training for production of organic compost; installation of 
clean water supply
 Infrastructure: Productive infrastructure (drying patios); 
implementation of reward-based system for providing 
infrastructure
Social: Community-building (access to public utilities); family 
training (e.g., household economics); investment in public 
goods (education centres)
 Entrepreneurial: Formation and commercialization of 
associations; entrepreneurial capacity through training 
(organizational management; accounting practices)
1,160 coffee growers certified Main results 600 infrastructure projects completed
1,211 capacity building workshops 25 associations newly formed
25 associations created for 442 farmers 238 farmers certified
2,133 infrastructure projects completed 111 farms received new water treatment systems
1,080 water tanks delivered to families
Sources: IOM (2013): Recopilacion de Experiencias Desarrollo Sostenible para Familias Cafecultoras Departmento de Nariño. Partnership document.
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specific questions in mind related to the (interplay) of mechanisms 
and practices of governing the tensions (see Table 2). The paper of-
fers quotes where relevant and they have been used primarily for 
illustrative purposes.
4  | FINDINGS
The two successive partnership phases suggest that various formal 
and informal governance mechanisms were at (inter)play throughout 
the partnering process (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). This had implica-
tions for how tensions and governance arrangements emerged and 
evolved throughout the two phases of the partnership.
4.1 | Phase 1: Relationship building supported 
by control
The interrelation of challenges for small coffee farmers in the 
Colombian department of Nariño (see the section on research con-
text), and the potential for linking commercial and development in-
terests, were the reason to form a partnership between Empresas de 
Nariño, Starbucks Co., Carecafe Foundation, and the International 
Organization for Migration in 2004. The organizations developed a 
project proposal and submitted it to the Dutch Embassy in Bogotá 
for potential funding under the tender “Call for Ideas” that aimed to 
involve the private sector more actively in development cooperation 
(Van Tulder & Pfisterer, 2008). The “Call for Ideas” fund was based 
on the idea of shared project financing: 50% of the required project 
fund was to be invested by the applicants and 50% by the develop-
ment agency. The development agency's predefined programme cri-
teria set the framework for fine-tuning the project design. Project 
partners and development agency staff designed the project to-
gether as a multiple-impact programme for vulnerable coffee-grow-
ing communities. It eventually consisted of three core components, 
including economic activities (e.g., certification, association forma-
tion), environmental activities (e.g., preventing erosion, water treat-
ment) and social activities (e.g., community-building programmes, 
training in household economics and investments in education cen-
tres). During the partnership formation, the development agency's cri-
teria provided guidance for the organizations on how to develop the 
partnership project. However, due to the associated pressure of the 
criteria, the process was at risk of undermining the space for building 
relationships.
Because what our experience in both partnerships shows 
is that the actual start-up of the project is the most diffi-
cult. And generally, donors put a lot of pressure on that, 
F I G U R E  1   Chronology of control and collaboration events in the case
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they are the ones who put in the resources, they also gen-
erate pressure because they have pressure from above at 
the same time and need to focus on results. Those things 
take time. And many times, in their urge of looking at re-
sults, which is normal and happens with all donors, there 
is no space in the project for a process that may get the 
people really committed to and involved in the strategy. 
(interview quote, IOM, 2011)
The tension between the accountability requirements and the 
time required for relationship building was managed by several gover-
nance mechanisms and practices. Formal accountability requirements 
included the partnership agreement, implementation schedules, com-
mittee structures, reporting and feedback schemes, which provided 
platforms for discursive interactions between partners. Six-monthly 
reporting included financial accounting as well as an evaluation of 
the collaboration between partners. Well-run procedures and a clear 
definition of activities and objectives ensured a straightforward fol-
low-up by partners with a supervisory role, mostly by the development 
agency. Co-funding of the project, joint project formulation, jointly 
writing monitoring reports and receiving and giving feedback provided 
the partners with control over the content and process of the project 
and stimulated the development of collaboration mechanisms, such 
as mutual confidence and commitment. The joint responsibility of the 
project facilitated confidence building and commitment towards each 
other, the joint project and the development agency.
If you accomplish the formal structure at the beginning 
of the project, that is a way to build more trust and con-
fidence, and at the same time this helps create a way to 
report to the donors for example. (interview quote, IOM, 
2013)
Committees were highlighted as crucial mechanisms for syn-
thesizing accountability requirements and relationship building. 
Committees were designed at various levels of the partnership: 
the executive partnering committee with the involvement of all 
partners was mainly responsible for assessing progress, dealing 
with financial issues and developing the strategy of the partner-
ship. Operational committees discussed the day-to-day activities. 
These committees had a formal and informal governance function. 
On the one hand, they provided a mechanism for holding each 
other accountable. By participating in the executive committee 
meetings, the development agency was better able to monitor 
the project and to detect underlying problems and challenges 
between partners. On the other hand, such committees were the 
place where mutual understanding developed. In addition, the 
output and management mechanisms of such committees (e.g., 
operative reports and action plans) provided a basis for discussion 
and ultimately led to relationship building.
I highlight this as a key learning point for all of us in both 
experiences. We were able to share information and 
TA B L E  2   Interplay between informal and formal governance mechanisms and practices
Interplay Practice/mechanism Formal element      Informal element
Accountability framework 
facilitated trust building 
what evolved in increased 




• Monitoring  
requirements
• External evaluator
Set the frame within which project 
and collaboration can evolve and 
unfold
Trust-building
Indirect donor control was 
perceived as commitment 
and evolved in active donor 
engagement
Facilitate meetings and 
negotiations at the 
embassy
Host of meeting; setting agenda; 
location
Coordination: create order and 
overcome conflict
Field visits Accountability: “see” what happens 
on the ground
• Empathy and interests for the 
project
• Deeper understanding for each 
other's needs
Regular interactions created 
understanding & trust as well 
as helped keeping each other 
accountable to each other
• Weekly (and later) 
monthly face-to-face 
meetings
• Spend time in the same 
office
Keep each other accountable 
through updates on progress and 
negotiate issues
• Talk with each other, exchange 
& take time to come towards 
agreement
• Work together; see and 
experience how an organization 
is working and its daily struggles 
(stepping into the other's shoes)
Mutual responsibility facilitated 
confidence
• Joint project  
formulation
• Jointly writing 
monitoring reports
• Co-funding the project
• Responsiveness
• Discuss feedback from and with 
donor
Design, organize and deliver as one
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make each other part of the decision-making because 
only like that you can truly share the victories and ac-
complishments but also the risks and difficulties. It is a 
way to make partners feel part of the same team, an im-
portant and active part of the dialogue and the process. 
(interview quote, IOM, 2013)
The development agency had an important role in facilitating 
these spaces for interaction. During partnership building, the devel-
opment agency created a neutral atmosphere for developing an un-
derstanding of each other's positions (e.g., through weekly meetings 
that were held at the embassy). In addition, the development agency 
used its position for conflict resolution by bringing in the ambassa-
dor as a last resort, if necessary. The formal and informal control and 
facilitation by the development agency during the intensive and pro-
longed negotiation phase resulted in the development of collective 
agency by the partners.
We jointly designed a proposal, and the proposal has 
always been presented by the partnership. (interview 
quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)
The partners perceived the frequent and regular interaction with 
the development agency staff as a commitment towards the part-
nership. During field visits, the tension of control and collaboration 
became evident. The development agency is accountable for the 
project to parliament (and ultimately the taxpayers) and, therefore, 
requires evidence of how well the money is spent during the project. 
Field visits provided an additional control mechanism for the devel-
opment agency to understand what was happening at the project 
sites. However, jointly organizing and performing a formal field visit 
also created a personal bond between the partners and the devel-
opment agency staff. The participation of the development agency 
in the field made project partners and farmers proud that the devel-
opment agency showed interest in the situation on the ground and 
cared for the project. When farmers were visited by the partners 
and the development agency, it gave them a feeling of pride and a 
sense of belonging to the partnership. In that sense, field visits had 
an important interrelated accountability and relationship-building 
function.
The development agency's active role and engagement were 
necessary for facilitating relationship building, and at the same time, 
its accountability requirements were necessary for developing a 
framework for collaboration. Working through this tension required 
an intensive trajectory of facilitating the partners and working dif-
ferently than diplomats are used to doing.
Nariño's small-scale farmers were not represented in the com-
mittees or any formal governance fora. They were not a formal 
partner in the partnership. After the selection of targeted commu-
nities, farmers were invited to join information sessions and to sign 
up. Several selection criteria decided who could participate in the 
activities. In PPP1, the interactions between partners and farmers 
were characterized by relationship building, mainly through formal 
governance structures and processes. In the initial phase of the proj-
ect, farmers had a low level of trust in the project, which slowed 
down implementation and made it difficult to gain commitment. 
These difficulties were influenced by farmers’ previous disappoint-
ments about development initiatives.
At the beginning, we did not believe we were going to re-
ceive all these benefits without anything in exchange. We 
even thought the person from IOM was from the guer-
rilla. (interview quote, coffee grower, PPP1)
On the one hand, the project deadlines put pressure on the ex-
ecution of activities. However, on the other hand, the quick results 
stimulated the farmers’ confidence in and commitment to the project. 
In addition, there were formal requirements for farmers, such as partic-
ipating in training programmes. By being actively involved in the activ-
ities and receiving information about the project, they also developed 
a sense of belonging as a part of the value chain.
Before the project, we only knew that Empresas de 
Nariño was buying our coffee. After being involved in 
this, we came to know where our coffee is heading, that 
Empresas de Nariño sells our coffee to Starbucks. We 
are delighted that our coffee can be enjoyed all over the 
world and that people like it. This is our interest day after 
day: the more they like it, the better. (interview quote, 
coffee grower, PPP1)
A lesson learned from PPP1 was that farmers’ commitment can 
increase if they are not merely considered as aid receivers but as busi-
ness partners. During this project, Empresas de Nariño developed 
direct relationships with the coffee farmers. Farmers started to sell 
their product directly to the company. However, they also sold their 
coffee to other exporters as they did not wish to be dependent on one 
exporter.
It [the project] made the company more visible to the 
farmers; it brought us closer… many farmers have de-
cided to increase the share of their produce that they sell 
to us. (interview quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)
4.2 | Phase 2: Less donor control, more partner 
autonomy, more emphasis on farmer engagement
In 2007, most activities were completed, suggesting that the part-
nership was ending. At that time, partners were convinced that posi-
tive results had been achieved and that their expectations had been 
exceeded. PPP1 managed to expand the outreach of the project and 
certified 1,160 coffee-growing families in 10 municipalities in the 
northern part of Nariño. Moreover, the partnership was recognized 
as a successful development initiative by other institutions in public, 
private and civil sectors. As a result—and conscious of the potential 
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for reaching out to even more families in Nariño—the partners de-
cided to extend their collaboration in a second project. However, 
the Dutch Embassy did not provide further financial assistance due 
to question marks about the added value of replication strategies. 
However, the other partners had built an apparently effective col-
laborative relationship, were committed to the idea of continuing the 
collaborative work and had the knowledge to do so. Thus, after the 
exit of the Dutch embassy, USAID entered the partnership as co-
founder in 2008 (PPP2).
The change of development agency brought differences in the 
partnership dynamics and reporting mechanisms and resulted in a 
partnership agreement with adjusted collaboration terms. Partners 
initially devised a large project for the second phase, but plans had to 
be adapted due to a lower budget. The selection of target groups was 
adapted, and operational activities were reorganized. The second 
project was launched in May 2009, 18 months after PPP1 formally 
ended. USAID’s participation focused on the project's attention on 
farmers located in areas with a higher incidence of armed conflict. 
As such, the second phase of the partnership concentrated efforts 
in the more vulnerable western region of Nariño, and its name 
was changed into “Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee 
Growing Families Victims of the Armed Conflict in Nariño”. Due to a 
lower budget and shorter project time, activities were redesigned 
to focus on improving production and gaining certification for 800 
farms (see Table 1 for an overview). Because of these boundaries due 
to the donor's requirements, the partners adapted the design, which 
was experienced as an improvement to the project. The change also 
prevented a “lock-in situation” where partners replicated a project 
with little deviation in relation to the preceding project (Manning & 
Sydow, 2011) but stimulated a transfer of learning about the part-
nership process.
I think that the donor can always bring new blood, new 
ideas and support that can contribute to the project, new 
interests that can be discussed and talked over. (inter-
view quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)
Partners highlighted that they did not accept all the project adap-
tations suggested by the development agency but emphasized their 
ownership of the project and experience with the strategy and on-the-
ground knowledge. They had developed agency due to their partner-
ing experience gained in PPP1.
The development agency's tension was less obvious in PPP2 
compared with PPP1 for two reasons. First, the lead partner had au-
tonomy over the disbursement of resources due to the long-term and 
institutionalized relationship with the development agency. As such, 
USAID’s role was more external in the partnership, compared with 
the active and internal role of the Dutch Embassy. As a result, USAID 
found it easier to balance the tension between being a partner and 
a funder. Control was situated at a different level: the development 
agency had sufficient funding links (and, therefore, control) through 
the institutionalized relationship with the lead partner, which resulted 
in a high level of autonomy for the project management.
Second, in PPP2 there was less need for facilitation by the de-
velopment agency. Relationships between the partners had matured, 
and fewer meetings were required because the partners had devel-
oped confidence in each other and the underlying formal governance 
mechanisms. The previous partnering experience in PPP1 had re-
sulted in an increased understanding of each other's needs and re-
quirements. The quarterly reporting mainly focused on the technical 
aspects of the project. Reports were prepared by the lead partner and 
shared/requested input from others. Because there was less interac-
tion with the development agency, transparency mechanisms became 
more important in PPP2. The reporting in the second phase focused 
solely on describing outputs and outcomes of project activities.
Sharing information is definitely important, that partners 
share in the decision-making process because it makes 
them common owners of the risks involved. (interview 
quote, IOM, 2013)
PPP2 operated in a highly vulnerable context, and the persistent 
conflict hindered the implementation of activities. For example, 
transportation of materials to the field was hampered by lengthy 
procedures to ensure secure access. Partners were forced to change 
the specifics of activities during implementation because of security 
threats. This led to unexpected costs and delays. However, thanks to 
their confidence, all partners showed flexibility.
A lesson learned from the PPP1 was that changing Nariño's 
growers’ culture of distrust and motivating them to work together 
requires more attention in a possible next project. Therefore, PPP2 
emphasized the need for a more pro-active attitude of the farmers. 
PPP2 introduced a competitive instrument to increase the com-
mitment of coffee-growing associations and developed a series of 
capacity-building workshops with clearly defined practical objec-
tives for farms and associations. After completing these workshops, 
farmers and associations were evaluated and scored on their perfor-
mance and progress in achieving the objectives (e.g., implementation 
of best agricultural practices, increasing the amount of coffee sold, 
achieving quality standards). The most successful associations were 
rewarded with a quality-enhancing infrastructure for member farms. 
This tool was successful, but not all associations were still in oper-
ation after the project ended, suggesting that the project duration 
was too short to consolidate relationships in newly formed associ-
ations. In addition to this, the competition for Nariño coffee supply 
empowered farmers to choose the best-paying buyers. This compet-
itive pricing put a strain on unconsolidated relationships between 
Empresas de Nariño and some farmers.
5  | DISCUSSION
What does the governance narrative of the case study reveal about 
how the two selected tensions were governed? Moreover, what can 
we learn from this for further theory building on the governance of 
CSPDs in conflict-affected areas?
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5.1 | Stimulating long-term transformative 
relationships through temporary and short-
term projects
Formal governance structures and the processes of the first phase 
made it possible to build relationships that instilled confidence and 
showed how to replicate partnerships in communities with higher 
risks of armed conflict. Formal governance facilitated relationship 
building in the early stages of the partnership. The project increased 
responsiveness and helped participants “deliver as one” by pro-
moting mutual responsibility that facilitated confidence building, 
and by joint project formulation, jointly written monitoring reports 
and co-funding. The importance of trust building was evident. This 
enriches our understanding of how formal control measures could 
help build relational quality rather than undermine trust (Walters & 
Anagnostopoulos, 2012). Other research on collaboration supports 
this argument, indicating that processes and structures work closely 
together to foster cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al., 2015). 
Joint responsibility through reporting and monitoring mechanisms 
are often highlighted as critical formal implementation structures 
for ensuring ongoing efforts (Clarke, 2014), but are equally impor-
tant for learning purposes. In PPP2, partners required fewer formal 
governance mechanisms because of the experience gained from 
PPP1. Another factor that facilitated successful governance was 
that “values and interests of partners become preserved because, 
over time, all the major actors involved remained part of the power 
structure” (Jimenez & Pasquero, 2005). Over time, relationships ma-
tured. Diplomatic relationships were established between partners 
and the development agency, and private sector actors developed 
commercial relationships. Individuals involved in the partnerships 
still make active use of both their working relationships and their 
personal contacts with one another. The gradual shift from formal 
towards informal governance mechanisms helped the partners man-
age the tension created by stimulating long-term transformative re-
lationships through temporary and short-term project design. These 
insights help to understand how and what helped the partnership 
to ensure its endurance beyond the project deadline (Jimenez & 
Pasquero, 2005).
One key challenge for the partnership was managing the transi-
tion towards long-term relationships with farmers. In Colombia, we 
experienced a high level of distrust towards institutions and their 
standards. Colombians are known for their loyalty, pride and cohe-
siveness in their organizations or families (Paez & Salgado, 2016). 
The time pressure inherent in the short-term project design was a 
key challenge in overcoming the farmers’ distrust of the programme.
5.2 | Transforming relationships in the context of 
power asymmetries
The framework of accountability established by both donors fa-
cilitated the partners’ trust building which, in turn, evolved into in-
creased responsiveness towards each other. Funding criteria, funding 
contracts, monitoring requirements and reporting set the frame 
within which the project and collaboration evolved and unfolded. In 
the context of a low-trust society, the donor-driven control frame-
work provided a safe space in which relationships between partners 
could develop. Indirect donor control was perceived as commitment 
and evolved into active donor engagement. Coordination increased 
by holding meetings and negotiations at the embassy while informal 
governance mechanisms had a control emphasis (such as location 
(embassy), and agenda setting). Moreover, the case highlighted that 
partners, as well as farmers, gained agency during the partnership. 
The partners came across as more mature and confident during the 
formalization of the second phase. In the case analysed, it was ap-
parent that the partners had become empowered to negotiate about 
and contest the content and activities of the partnership through-
out the process of partnering. Smallholders were empowered in the 
value chain as a result of the partnership.
5.3 | Three discussion points
The analysis of how tensions could be addressed by governance 
leads to three interrelated discussion points about the governance 
of CSPDs in conflict settings.
First, formal and informal governance in CSPDs changed, 
evolved, complemented and facilitated each other throughout the 
implementation of the two projects. This finding stresses the im-
portance to broaden the approach of extant partnership studies 
that mainly focus on governance as structural mechanisms but not 
as processes (e.g., Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 2012) and focus on 
trust as key informal mechanism (e.g., Das & Teng, 2001). Formal and 
informal governance interplayed both simultaneously and consec-
utively over a longer period. From a decision-making point of view, 
therefore, it becomes relevant to consider which governance mech-
anisms are time dependent and which can be considered cumulative. 
Formal governance appears to have facilitated relationship building 
throughout the process of partnering in some instances. This pro-
vides more nuance to the discussion of whether formal and infor-
mal governance complement or substitute each other (e.g., Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). The tendency towards formal governance was partic-
ularly evident in the formation phase of both partnerships. We rec-
ognized similar patterns of reoccurrence of governance mechanisms 
throughout the two life cycles of the Nariño case as described by, 
for example, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) and Bryson et al. (2015). 
Nevertheless, our case emphasizes the importance of prior relation-
ships (Murphy et al., 2015), as it is often through these that partners 
and farmers feel committed to and responsible for the joint project 
beyond the funding deadline. It is interesting to note that similar for-
mal and informal governance structures and processes shaped both 
tensions at the same time. This builds upon and enriches Hayes et al. 
(2011) suggested approach to understanding tensions and gover-
nance approaches of partnerships.
Second, we argue that accountability can be instrumental in 
promoting more cooperative approaches among partners. Kolk and 
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Lenfant’s (2015b, p. 294) research on partnerships in fragile states 
showed a donor's support goes beyond “risk sharing”, and that 
a funding mechanism also facilitates the partnering process and 
can help companies in going beyond compliance with formal con-
tract arrangements. In contrast to other studies on partnership dy-
namics with donor involvement (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; 
Pishchikova, 2014), our case shows that donor control can facilitate 
the development of collaborative governance. Governance struc-
tures such as formal committees that facilitate both joint account-
ability and interactions are examples of mechanisms that engage 
both control and collaboration. Moreover, the donor's engagement 
in the partnership was highly perceived as collaborative and not as 
control by partners. Therefore, our case partly disproves the prop-
osition by Rufin and Rivera-Santos (2012) that trust-based gov-
ernance will play a minimal role in the governance of partnerships 
between private and public actors. The partners developed trustful 
relationships with the donor representative that also extended be-
yond the partnership project. However, the level of engagement by 
the development agency was different. This can partly be explained 
by the importance the development agency attaches to the partner-
ship and the level of experience of facilitating partnerships. Dutch 
development cooperation has a smaller budget and project portfolio 
and fewer staff in Colombia than USAID. The Nariño project was 
one of the first CSPDs facilitated by the Dutch Embassy in Colombia, 
but there were many projects under the institutional funding agree-
ment between USAID and IOM. PPP2 required less intensive facil-
itation by the development agency because the partners had prior 
experience. Case-dependent facilitation, therefore, appears most 
suitable for CSPDs. The findings highlight that development agen-
cies can actively shape the governance and relationships of CSPDs 
throughout the partnering process. However, the influence develop-
ment agencies have on partnership governance, and their new role 
as “partners”, lead to questions about their responsibilities after their 
project funding ended. These insights contribute to the literature on 
the role and engagement of public development agencies in driving 
corporate citizenship (Pedersen, 2005), and brokering partnerships 
(Stadtler & Probst, 2012).
Third, in spite of some shortcomings in the inclusion of farmers 
and associations in the formal governance of the partnership, farm-
ers, in general, felt they were a part of the partnership. The part-
nership uplifted their position in the coffee market. They were not 
dependent on one exporter; on the contrary, they continued to sell 
their coffee to the exporter that paid the best price. Our study adds 
empirical evidence to the study by Civera et al. (2019) on the em-
powering of smallholders. Like Civera et al. (2019), our study empha-
sizes the importance of the quality of relationships that eventually 
benefit the whole value creation process. Long-term relationship de-
velopment requires relationships that need to be nurtured beyond 
the project's lifetime through technical support, revising certifica-
tions and referring to project impact during interactions. This can 
only be achieved with a long-term, inclusive governance approach 
by companies and the partnership. In this case study, the partner 
organizations internalized the lessons learned and gained partnering 
capacities. One example of this was a local coffee exporter who 
further developed their Corporate Social Responsibility policy and 
practice beyond compliance (cf., Barkemeyer, 2009) with the original 
governance contract. The fact that the local exporter was deeply 
embedded in the Nariño region also helped to develop ownership 
and sustain relationships beyond the project deadline.
6  | CONCLUSIONS
One governance gap in extant partnering arrangement became par-
ticularly evident in the Nariño case: how do partnerships that aim 
to create links between commercial and development objectives 
coordinate their activities and approaches with competitors in the 
region? Small coffee farmers in Nariño were confronted with the 
problem of securing their livelihoods in a conflict-affected region. An 
integrative, collaborative approach was required that encompasses 
poverty reduction and changing value chain relations between busi-
ness and farmers by empowering farmers and providing long-term 
economic perspectives. However, development projects in general, 
and partnerships with business and development agency involve-
ment specifically, are often short term and are challenged to change 
relationships and ensure local ownership due to persistent power 
imbalances (Pishchikova, 2014; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). 
Our study illustrates that governance approaches such as CSPDs 
can yield innovative ways of developing mutual accountability. They 
can implement transparency practices in post-conflict contexts that 
may be characterized by low trust between societal actors. Our 
study shows that power asymmetries and short-term project design 
might remain a key challenge for partnerships in development co-
operation, but that governance mechanisms and practices need to 
be dynamic: they can emerge, change and unfold over time in order 
to effectively deal with the unavoidable tensions that appear in 
CSPDs. Understanding how governance works in CSPDs can assist 
the design and management of future partnerships by dealing more 
consciously with tensions in order to develop sustainable partner-
ship project approaches for addressing grand challenges. This also 
helps to better understand the conditions when partnerships with 
business involvement can represent new governance modalities in 
(post-)conflict settings (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015b) and can help com-
panies to move out of a reactive—risk-oriented—CSR approach that 
they would normally adopt when faced with institutional voids (Van 
Tulder, 2018).
Our study focused on a unique case but yields relevant lessons 
for a broader range of partnerships and collaborative governance ar-
rangements with business involvement in complex settings. In this 
line, we propose three possible future research avenues related to 
the conflict context, the actor configuration and research approach.
First, CSDPs can work in a variety of conflict types. Partnerships, 
such as the one we describe in this paper, use temporary partner-
ship projects to gain longer term effects by, for example, involving 
private sector investments that can help create longer term (proto) 
institutions. The historic nature of the case is relative, due to the 
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consideration that other (conflict-ridden) regions around the world 
that are engaged in comparable CSPDs (such as in the eastern 
Republic of Congo or the island of Mindanao in the Philippines) are 
more comparable to the situation in Colombia in 2012 than at pres-
ent. In addition, the Nariño case is an example of a transformative 
partnership that managed to introduce (institutional) change at the 
local level. Future research could explore how partnerships for de-
velopment in (post-)conflict settings are governed at national or in-
ternational level. Do these types of partnerships experience similar 
tensions, and what type of practices do they develop for governing 
the collaboration over a longer period? Comparing the tensions and 
governance approaches of partnerships in different conflict settings, 
types of conflict and conflict stages would be an interesting research 
avenue. It would add to the typology of partnerships in (post-)con-
flict areas as developed by Kolk and Lenfant (2015a).
Second, the case study primarily addressed the governance ten-
sion in tripartite partnerships for development in which public devel-
opment agencies and private companies play a leading role in funding 
the partnership. In our case, the criteria and decision for funding, as 
stipulated by the development agency, created power asymmetries. 
Power asymmetries and temporary project design are also at stake 
in other types of cross-sector governance arrangements. These ten-
sions may play out differently if only one organization provides the 
funding, as is often the case in service delivery relationships. Or if, in 
cases with more private parties—with less need for public account-
ability—only one organization participates or even takes the lead. 
The question emerges how tensions are governed by partnerships 
with various partner configurations.
Finally, the importance of a more dynamic approach to gover-
nance issues also suggests that other monitoring and evaluation 
techniques are required. A promising way to deal with governance 
tensions in multistakeholder processes can be learned from develop-
mental evaluation techniques (Patton, 2011) in which, for instance, 
joint action research projects are set up, in which practitioners and 
researchers participate on a more continuous basis. To recognize, ac-
cept and consciously work through tensions is not easy and requires 
both adaptation and flexibility from organizations. Cross-sector 
governance arrangements add an additional layer of complexity to 
working with and through tensions. A paradox lens to get above 
and beyond the two analysed tensions may be an interesting step 
towards developing a practice-oriented theory on collaboration, as 
suggested by Siv Vangen (2016).
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 1 Bilateral development agencies are government agencies based in a 
single country, while the agency provides development aid following 
its national development policy. The tendency in literature is to cluster 
multilateral and bilateral agencies and even international nongovern-
mental organizations under the term “donor”. There is, however, a call 
for a more heterogenic view on donors, because the roles of “donors” 
and emerging governance challenge are expected to be different de-
pending on the type of development agency involved in the partner-
ship (Pishchikova, 2014). 
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APPENDIX A .  ANALYSED DOCUMENTS
Year Phase Author Type of document
2004 1 IOM, ENA Project document
2004 1 IOM, ENA, Embassy MoU for PPP1
2005 1 IOM, ENA, Embassy Progress report 1
2006 1 ENA. Starbucks Expansion proposal
2006 1 IOM, ENA, Starbucks, Embassy Progress report 2
2007 1 IOM, ENA, Embassy Final report
2008 1 Building Partnerships for Development Mid-term review
2009 2 IOM Partnership agreement
2010 2 IOM Progress report 1
2010 2 IOM Progress report 2
2010 2 IOM Progress report 3
2010 2 IOM Extension agreement
2011 2 IOM Progress report 4
2011 2 IOM Progress report 5
2011 2 ENA Application peace prize
2012 2 IOM Pilot project proposal
2012 2 IOM, ENA, USAID Final report pilot project
2013 1 & 2 IOM, ENA, Starbucks, Fundacion Carcafe, Dutch embassy, USAID Compilation of experiences
APPENDIX B .  L IS T OF INTERVIE WEE S
Organization Phase
Spring 2011 (Date, type, 
location)
Summer 2013 (Date, 
type, location)
Autumn 2013 (Date, type, 
location)
Empresas de Nariño 1 & 2 March 17, 2011 (Interview in 
Bogota)
June 19, 2013 
(Telephone interview)
October 21, 2013 (Interview in 
Bogota)
Empresas de Nariño 2 March 17, 2011 (Interview in 
Bogota)
June 17, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
Several interviews and personal 
communication October 2013 
(Bogota & Pasto)
IOM 1 & 2 March 25, 2011 (Interview in 
Bogota)
June 25, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
October 22, 2013 (Interview in 
Bogota)
IOM 1 & 2 March 25, 2011 (Interview in 
Bogota)
June 26, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
October 25, 2013 (Interview in 
Pasto)
Empresas de Nariño 1 & 2 – June 14, 2013(Skype 
interview)
October 24, 2013 (Interview in 
Pasto)
Empresas de Nariño 1 & 2 – June 18, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
October 24, 2013 (Interview in 
Pasto)
Empresas de Nariño 2 – June 24, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
October 24, 2013 (Interview in 
Pasto)
Government of Nariño 1 & 2 – – October 24, 2013 (Interview in 
Pasto)
IOM 1 – – October 22, 2013 (Interview in 
Bogota)
IOM 2 – – October 22, 2013 (Interview in 
Bogota)
Starbucks Coffee Trading Co. 1 & 2 – June 19, 2013 
(Telephone interview)
–
USAID 2 – June 26, 2013 
(Telephone interview)
October 30, 2013 (Interview in 
Bogota)
Dutch Embassy Bogota 1 – August 05, 2013 
(Interview in The 
Hague)
November 08, 2013 (Interview in 
The Hague)
(Continues)
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Organization Phase
Spring 2011 (Date, type, 
location)
Summer 2013 (Date, 
type, location)
Autumn 2013 (Date, type, 
location)
Dutch Embassy Bogota End of 
phase 1
Several interviews and personal 
communications March–May 
2011
August 14, 2013 
(Telephone interview)
–





– – November 06, 2013 (Skype 
interview)
2 coffee growing families and 
1 association
1   October 25, 2013 (field visit)
2 coffee growing associations 2   October 26, 2013 (field visit)
APPENDIX B .  (Cont inued)
